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ABSTRACT
In 2018, the Trump Administration claimed for the first time that
the United States erred in supporting China’s accession to the World
Trade Organization because China has failed to fulfill its
commitments to dismantle its state-led economy and adopt openmarket oriented reforms.
Instead, China has maintained a
mercantilist state-led economy in which China provides preferential
treatment to its state-owned enterprises and supports their exports
while it discriminates against U.S. companies in China and creates
barriers to U.S. imports. Frustrated with being unable to effect
change through dialogue, the United States is now using punitive
trade sanctions against China in disregard of the WTO. China has
retaliated in kind, igniting a potential global trade war.
A review of the background of China’s accession to the WTO
indicates, however, that China never made any commitments to
dismantle the state sector of its economy and is not otherwise legally
bound to do so under the WTO. The claim that China agreed to
adopt open markets is a myth created by President Bill Clinton due
to wishful thinking or political expediency when he sought
congressional support for China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.
Clinton argued that China’s WTO entry would lead to the adoption
of economic freedoms that in turn would lead to political freedoms
and greater protection for human rights. Clinton even dangled the
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possibility China could shed the shackles of communism and
embrace democracy. In response to Clinton’s grandiose vision,
China remained cautious and made no extravagant promises. China
promised only to adopt a hybrid system in which some free markets
would operate within an overall state-led economy. Rather than
dismantling its state-led economy after its WTO accession, China
has incessantly strengthened it. Tightening the state’s grip over the
economy serves important goals of the Communist Party, including
further entrenching its power, whereas loosening its grip would be
tantamount to relinquishing power, a prospect that the Party will
never accept. This Article argues that the United States must finally
reject the Clinton myth and accept that China has no intention of
dismantling its state-led economy. Only with this sober realization
can the United States deal effectively in the future with China in the
WTO, in bilateral trade negotiations outside of the WTO, and
beyond.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the United States has long been critical of China’s
compliance with its obligations under the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the Trump Administration broke new ground
in 2018 by stating that “the United States erred in supporting China’s
entry into the WTO on terms that have proven ineffective in securing
China’s embrace of an open, market-oriented trade regime.”1 The
claim that the United States mistakenly supported China’s WTO
membership goes beyond any criticism in previous U.S.
administrations, which had always viewed China’s membership in
the WTO, with all of its shortcomings, as an overall benefit to the
multilateral trading system.2 The Trump Administration’s claim
1
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
CHINA’S
WTO
COMPLIANCE
2
(Jan.
2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20WT
O%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ND7-NS74] [hereinafter 2017 USTR REPORT].
2
The pessimistic and critical tone of the 2017 USTR Report stands in stark
contrast to annual USTR reports submitted during prior U.S. administrations on
China’s WTO compliance. These reports were markedly more optimistic and
enthusiastic about China’s membership in the WTO. For example, in its 2015
Report, submitted during the Obama Administration, the USTR referred to the
“tremendous potential presented by China’s WTO membership, including the
breadth and depth of trade and investment—and prosperity—possible in a
thriving, balanced global trading system.” See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 4 (Dec.
2015),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2015-Report-to-Congress-ChinaWTO-Compliance.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T57-KHTB].
In its 2010 Report,
submitted during the Bush Administration, the USTR stated: “Despite the many
challenges that remain, China’s WTO membership has continued to provide
substantial ongoing benefits to the United States. Each year since China joined the
WTO, . . . U.S.-China trade has expanded dramatically, providing numerous and
substantial opportunities for U.S. businesses, workers, farmers and service
suppliers and a wealth of affordable goods for U.S. consumers.” See OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO
COMPLIANCE 3 (Dec. 2010), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/
gsp/speeches/reports/2010/2010%20Report%20to%20Congress%20%20Dec%2023%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/BX9C-NX7X]. In its first report on
China’s compliance with the WTO submitted during the Clinton Administration,
the USTR stated: “Overall, during the first year of its WTO membership, China
made significant progress in implementing its WTO commitments, although much
is left to do. . . . Despite the compliance problems that arose over the course of the
past year, most private sector representatives remain enthusiastic about the actual
and potential benefits for U.S. industry from China’s WTO membership.” See
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S
WTO
COMPLIANCE
3,
5
(Dec.
2002),
https://www.google.com/
url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEw
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indicates a new level of U.S. dissatisfaction with China’s WTO
compliance and foreshadows new, more extreme measures in
response.3
The crux of the Trump Administration’s complaint is that China
has broken its promises to implement economic reforms that would
eventually dismantle China’s state-led, mercantilist economy,
including the economy’s dominance by powerful state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), business corporations that are administrative
units of the state.4 Under the U.S. view, China made legal
commitments as part of its entry into the WTO under its Protocol of
Accession,5 Working Party Report,6 and the WTO agreements,7 to
is58vO8M_fAhWB8oMKHaZYAxcQFjAAegQICRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fww
w.cfr.org%2Fcontent%2Fpublications%2Fattachments%2FSPRing0315.09-thru15.13.pdf&usg=AOvVaw02vvzsinPIpS8ZGi60G4DJ
[https://perma.cc/JJ4SWLP2].
3
These measures include the use of unilateral trade sanctions against China,
i.e. trade sanctions imposed without consulting with and in defiance of the WTO.
See Daniel C.K. Chow, United States Unilateralism and the World Trade Organization,
37 B.U. INT’L L. J. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Chow, United States Unilateralism)].
4 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 458 (Wolters Kluwer, 3d ed. 2015)
[hereinafter CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS]; see also
2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
5
World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s
Republic
of
China,
WTO
Doc.,
WT/L/432
(Nov.
23,
2001)
https://docsonline.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/DirectDoc.aspx?filename=t%3A%2
Fwt%2Fl%2F432.doc& [https://perma.cc/GGD9-EPGX] [hereinafter China
Protocol of Accession]. China’s Protocol of Accession was negotiated between
China and other WTO members and sets forth the conditions of China’s entry into
the WTO.
6
World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of
China,
WTO
Doc.
WT/ACC/CHN/49
(Oct.
1,
2000),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/wp_acc_china_e.doc
[https://perma.cc/2XFE-R72H] [hereinafter China Working Party Report]. This
document sets forth the negotiation history of China’s accession into the WTO with
other WTO members, led by the United States. In 1987, a working party was created
to discuss the many conditions of China’s entry into the WTO. The negotiation
process took fourteen years, culminating in China’s accession in 2001.
7
Upon China’s accession to the WTO, China became bound to abide by all of
the multilateral WTO agreements. See China Protocol of Accession, supra note 5 at
art. 1. These are set forth in Annexes 1-2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization and include the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, the General Agreement on Trade in Services, the Agreement on Trade
Related Intellectual Property Rights, and the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. See Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/5E54-VMJ4] [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. In addition,
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implement changes that would gradually replace its state-led
economy with an economy based upon open market principles,
consistent with the underlying foundations of the WTO.8 China’s
failure to fulfill its WTO commitments has allowed China to reap the
benefits of WTO membership and become a dominant trading
nation while not allowing the United States to enjoy reciprocal
benefits in obtaining access to China’s markets.9 Moreover, China is
actively harming U.S. interests with a host of mercantilist policies
that discriminate against U.S. companies in China.10 Some of these
specific arguments against China are not new to the Trump
Administration but were also asserted by past U.S. administrations.
For nearly two decades, since the administration of President Bill
Clinton, the United States has asserted that China promised to
dismantle the state sector and adopt an open market-oriented
economy as part of its entry into the WTO.11
Despite these claims by the United States, however, an
examination by this Article of the history of China’s accession
process and the relevant WTO documents indicates that China never
pledged to dismantle its state-led economy and, as the United States
asserts, to “move towards a true market economy.”12 The claim that
China promised to implement free market reforms is a myth created
by the United States as a result of wishful thinking, political
expedience, and willful ignorance of China’s major industrial
policies and national initiatives developed and announced with
great fanfare by China since the early 2000s shortly after China’s
entry into the WTO.13 These policies and initiatives boldly support
the exact opposite conclusion: China is committed to strengthening
the state sector, not dismantling it.14 This Article explains why China
never made a commitment to dismantle the state sector, why China
was under no WTO obligations when it acceded to the WTO in 2001,
like all WTO members, China became bound by many specialized agreements
associated with GATT that are set forth in Annex 1A.
8
See 2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See infra Section II.B.
12
See 2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that bilateral trade talks
with China have repeatedly failed, not due to the fault of U.S. policymakers, “but
because Chinese policymakers were not interested in moving toward a true market
economy.”).
13
See infra Section II.B.
14
See infra Section III.A.
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and why the United States created this myth. China always
intended to be a state-led economy as a member of the WTO. Given
these realities, this Article explains the consequences for U.S. trade
policy towards China for the future, which must be guided by the
following three major points.
First, an examination of the documentary records surrounding
the negotiations leading up to China’s accession to the WTO
indicates that China never promised to implement open marketoriented reforms that would dismantle the state sector.15 This claim
was first asserted by President Bill Clinton to gain congressional
approval for permanent Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for
China in trade as part of China’s accession to the WTO.16 Although
China did indicate during the WTO negotiations that it would
implement economic reforms, these reforms were to occur within
the overall framework of a state-led economy.17 In addition, an
examination of China’s accession documents, including the Protocol
of Accession, its Working Party Report, and the WTO agreements
indicates that nothing in these WTO documents creates a legal
obligation to adopt principles leading towards an open market
economy.18 To be clear, China did make specific commitments
under its Protocol of Accession, which set forth the conditions of its
admission to the WTO, as well as under WTO agreements and China
is arguably in breach of some of these specific obligations and the
United States may be able to assert viable claims against China in
the WTO dispute settlement system.19
But China’s having
committed breaches of specific obligations is not the same as
refusing to live up to its promises to dismantle the leading role of
the state sector in China’s economy.
Second, the Communist Party of China (the Party), in power as
China’s rulers, has no intention of dismantling the state-led
economy and replacing it with an open market economy.20 As
explained below, the organization of China’s economy as a state-led,
mercantilist economy allows the Party to control all vital sectors of

See infra Part II.
See infra Section II.B. Most Favored Nation status was required for China
to received favorable U.S. tariff rates. The MFN principle is further discussed in
note 83 infra.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
See infra Part III.
15
16
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the economy.21 For the Party, dismantling the state sector is
equivalent to relinquishing power and opening itself up to
challenges to its authority.22 The Party will not subject itself to this
precarious fate. As further explained below, the Party sees its role
as the savior of China due to reasons of history and destiny.23 No
ruler of China in its entire history has ever voluntarily surrendered
power.24 Chinese history and tradition indicate that the Mandate of
Heaven, by which the emperor exercises legitimate power and holds
the throne, is never voluntarily relinquished—it is forfeited.25 In
addition to the lessons of history, there are also some of the deepest
tendencies of human nature at play: the Party’s control of the stateled economy has allowed members of the Party, from its highest
ranks on down to the lowest, to amass vast personal wealth.26
Third, not only will China refuse to abandon the state-led
economy, China will continuously strive to strengthen the role of the
state for the foreseeable future.27 For the Party, strengthening the
leading state sector further enhances its own power, further
entrenches its role as China’s ruler, and further promotes the
individual interests of Party members.28 Under the leadership of
President Xi Jinping, the Party has shown the tendency to further
augment its power, not to diminish it.29 The best example of this
tendency is Xi himself who has now installed himself as a de facto
ruler-for-life in China.30 The United States must realize and accept
that this is China’s position. For years, the United States has
engaged in trade negotiations with China with the goal of having
China dismantle the state-led sector.31 The United States frequently
claims that while China is willing to implement small scale changes,
See infra Part III.
Id.
23
See DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 120 (3d
ed. 2015) [hereinafter CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA].
24
Id. at 121 (“In the more than 2,000 years of Chinese history dating back to
the earliest Imperial Dynasty, the Eastern Zhou (771-256 BC), no ruling government
of mainland China has ever voluntarily relinquished or transferred power to a
succeeding government. No succeeding government has ever assumed power
without destroying the presiding government.”).
25
Id. The emperor also forfeits his life, along with his Mandate.
26
See infra Section III.C.
27
See infra Part IV.
28
See id.
29
See infra Section III.C.
30
See id.
31
See 2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-3.
21
22
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China is not willing to fundamentally change its system;32 China
makes promises that it will make fundamental changes to the stateled economy only to never follow through on those promises.33 The
reality is that the Party has no intention of dismantling the state
sector34, rather China will continuously develop a state-led
economic system that is the opposite of the type of open market
economy that the United States would like to see installed in China.35
To be clear, despite any U.S. claims to the contrary, China is a
sovereign nation that has every right and the full freedom to adopt
any economic system that it wishes.36 There is no inherent reason
why an open market economy is superior in a moral or legal sense
to a state-led economy.37 Countries that choose to trade with China
do so freely and with knowledge of the drawbacks of dealing with
China.38 If China made promises in the WTO to dismantle the state
sector that it did not keep or is bound by WTO obligations to do so
that it has breached, that is a valid complaint but this Article argues
that China neither made such promises nor is bound by any such
obligations. Moreover, it will become plain over the course of this
Article that the Party has no intention of ever dismantling China’s
state-led economy. Given this position, if the United States believes
that China’s economy is fundamentally at odds with the WTO then
the United States and other WTO countries are confronted with a
plain choice: they must either negotiate new conditions for China to
remain in the WTO as a state-led economy or seek China’s exit from
the WTO.39 The policy ramifications of this choice are further
examined in the concluding portions of this Article below.40
This Article will proceed in four parts as follows. Part II will first
discuss the U.S. complaints that China has not fulfilled its WTO
commitments to dismantle the state sector and reform its economy
in accordance with open market-oriented principles. Part II will also
discuss the background of China’s entry into the WTO. In the 1990s,
China viewed WTO membership as a priority.41 One major reason
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

See id. at 3.
See id.
See infra Section III.A.
See id.
See infra Part IV.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Section II.B.
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is that prior to China’s WTO membership, China had to endure the
annual humiliation of a review by the U.S. Congress of its human
rights record in order to obtain MFN tariff rates, much lower than
non-MFN rates, from the United States.42 WTO membership would
allow China to obtain MFN tariffs rates as a matter of right.43 Part II
also discusses the legal documents supporting China’s WTO entry
and shows that they did not create any commitments on China to
dismantle its state-led economy. Part III examines the critical role
that the state-led economy and SOEs play in allowing the Party to
control vital sectors of the economy. Part IV explains why the
United States must accept the reality that China will not abandon
the state-led economy or subject it to fundamental reforms so long
as the Party remains in power. Part IV concludes with some
observations for future U.S. trade policy concerning China.
II. CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WTO AND THE MYTH OF OPEN
MARKET REFORMS
A. China’s State-Led Economy and the WTO
The election of Donald J. Trump to the U.S. Presidency in 2016
led to a torrent of new criticism of China’s trade practices, including,
for the first time, a claim by a U.S. administration that it was a
mistake to support China’s entry into the WTO. Some of the
sharpest criticism of China’s trade practices are contained in two
recent reports by the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the
top U.S. trade official,44 submitted to Congress in 2018.45 According
Id.
Id.
44
See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 117 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter CHOW &
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW] (“Appointed by the President with
cabinet rank, the USTR is the chief official of the Executive Branch with respect to
international trade.”).
45
In addition to the 2017 USTR Report, supra note 1, on March 22, 2018, the
USTR also submitted an executive office investigation brought under Section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF
THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION
301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (Mar. 22, 2018) https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
42
43
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to the 2017 USTR Report, the underlying concern is that China
continues to maintain a state-led economy.46 In the 2017 Report, the
United States declared that “with the creation of the WTO, it was
expected that each WTO member would pursue open, marketoriented policies…”47 The United States expected that “the terms set
forth in China’s Protocol of Accession would dismantle China’s
existing state-led policies …”48 The United States further states:
It is important to recall that WTO members are supposed to
be moving toward market-based outcomes voluntarily. The
expectations of WTO membership were clearly set forth in
the Marrakesh Declaration on April 15, 1994, at the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations. There, WTO
members expressly affirmed their view that the
establishment of the WTO ushers in a “new era of global
economic cooperation” that “reflect[s] the widespread desire
to operate in a fairer and more open multilateral trading
system.”
WTO members further made clear their
determination that their economies would participate in the
international trading system based on both “open, marketoriented policies and the commitments set out in the Uruguay
Round Agreements and Decisions.49
The crux of the U.S. grievances against China is that it has
adopted a state-led mercantilist approach to international trade.50
China uses myriad measures, practices, and policies to support its
SOEs and other domestic Chinese companies in the internal China
market while at the same time discriminating against multinational
companies and other foreign companies.51 On international trade,
Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/QC6T-GYG9] [hereinafter
USTR SPECIAL 301 REPORT]. On November 20, 2018, the USTR subsequently filed a
report on China’s laws, policies, practices, or actions. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, UPDATE CONCERNING CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES
RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION (Nov.
20, 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/
301%20Report%20Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ2C-YLYD]. Both of these
reports are highly critical of China’s practices related to theft of U.S. intellectual
property rights.
46
2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
47
Id. at 5.
48
Id. at 2.
49
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
50
Id. at 3 (stating that “China continues to pursue myriad mercantilist
policies…”).
51
Id. at 4.
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China’s mercantilist policies strongly encourage and support
exports while at the same time create significant barriers to
imports.52 A major concern of the United States is China’s use of
subsidies, i.e. financial contributions from the government,53 to
support SOEs both within China and in export trade. The use of
subsidies to encourage exports by SOEs is viewed as particularly
pernicious in international trade because these subsidies allow SOEs
to sell their exports at lower prices in the United States thereby
harming U.S. companies and U.S. consumers.54
The United States singled out intellectual property rights (IPR)
as a special area of concern that needed an independent
investigation. On August 14, 2017, President Trump authorized the
USTR to conduct an investigation of China’s IPR practices under
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.55 In its report of the results of
its investigation, the USTR identified four areas of concern: (1) China
forces U.S. companies to transfer their technology (i.e., IPR) to SOEs
as a condition of setting up operations in China;56 (2) China imposes
discriminatory requirements on U.S. companies that license their
technologies to Chinese entities so that the U.S. licensors are unable
to obtain market terms in their licensing agreements;57 (3) China is
acquiring U.S. companies through mergers and acquisitions and
thereby also acquiring their IPR assets;58 and (4) China is hacking
into U.S. computer networks to acquire trade secrets from U.S.
52
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF TRADE & MANUFACTURING POLICY, HOW CHINA’S
ECONOMIC AGGRESSION THREATENS THE TECHNOLOGIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
UNITED
STATES
AND
THE
WORLD
1
(Jun.,
2018)
OF
THE
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-ChinaTechnology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SLB-Y24B] (stating that
China’s policies protect its home market from imports while expanding China’s
exports and share of global markets).
53
See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 44, at 467.
54
U.S. consumers and companies are harmed because after the lower priced
exports create a market niche by driving out domestic competitors, the exporter can
raise the price of its goods or lower their quality. See id. at 469.
55
THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. 14, 2017) https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-united-states-traderepresentative/ [https://perma.cc/Q2TT-65Y5]. The USTR conducts an annual
review of intellectual property protection by its trading partners under Section 182
of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, and the Trade Facilitation and
Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2015).
56
USTR SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 45, at 5.
57
Id.
58
Id.
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companies and confidential information from the U.S.
government.59 SOEs play significant roles behind the policies in all
of these areas.60
Given these are longstanding grievances that arise out of China’s
accession to the WTO, a question may arise as to why the United
States has not asserted these claims within the WTO dispute
settlement system. According to the United States, the WTO cannot
address its grievances:
While the WTO agreements do include a dispute settlement
mechanism, this mechanism is not designed to address a
situation in which a WTO member has opted for a state led
trade regime that prevails over market forces and pursues
policies guided by mercantilism rather than global economic
cooperation. The WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism is
narrowly targeted at good faith disputes where one member
believes that another member has adopted a measure or
taken an action that violates a WTO obligation . . . . [I]t is not
effective in addressing a trade regime that broadly conflicts
with the fundamental underpinnings of the WTO system.
No amount of enforcement activities by other WTO
members would be sufficient to remedy this type of
behavior.61

Id.
For example, in the case of technology transfers, the MNC may wish to set
up a manufacturing facility in China. The MNC may be required by law to set up
the manufacturing facility as a joint venture with a local Chinese partner. The local
partner will be an SOE in the same industrial sector as the MNC. PRC authorities
may require as a condition of approving the joint venture that the MNC transfer
valuable technology to the joint venture. China’s reasoning is that without
advanced technology the joint venture will not be able to manufacture the product.
If the MNC transfers technology to the joint venture, the SOE, as the local partner,
also acquires access to the MNC’s technology. The SOE can then use the technology
for its own purposes or provide access to the technology to the Chinese
government. MNCs claim that this is a form of “forced” technology because they
are required to form a joint venture and provide its technology to the joint venture
as a condition of entering the China market. In the second case above of
discriminatory licensing requirements, the MNC may be required to license its
technology to an SOE as a condition of being able to use the technology in China.
In the third case of purchasing equity interests in U.S. companies, a Chinese entity,
usually an SOE, will purchase the assets of a U.S. company and acquire all property
interests of the U.S. company including its intellectual property portfolio. In all of
these cases, SOEs can play a crucial role.
61
2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
59
60
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Adding further to U.S. frustrations, not only has China failed to
make any meaningful changes to its state-led economy to move
towards an open market in the intervening years since WTO
accession, instead, China has moved in the opposite direction by
further strengthening the grip of the state and increasing the role of
the state in its economy.62 All of this has occurred despite years of
negotiations with the United States.63 Exasperated, the United States
declared that since the “carrot” of negotiations with China has not
worked, it is now time for the United States to brandish the “stick”
of enforcement:
For more than 15 years, the United States has relied on
cooperative high-level dialogues to effect meaningful and
fundamental changes in China’s state-led, mercantilist trade
regime. These efforts have largely failed. Accordingly, the
United States intends to focus its efforts on enforcement
going forward . . . . The United States is determined to use
every tool available to address harmful Chinese policies and
practices . . . Americans have waited long enough. The time
has come for China to stop its market-distorting policies and
practices and finally become a responsible member of the
WTO.64
Apparently, the Trump Administration believes that since the
United States cannot persuade China through high-level dialogues
to adopt market reforms and the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism cannot discipline China, the United States will use
threats, intimidation, and punitive measures in order to coerce
China to adopt market reforms. The United States’ enforcement
arsenal “will include not only the use of the WTO’s dispute
settlement mechanism to hold China strictly accountable for
adherence to its WTO obligations, but also other needed
mechanisms, available under U.S. trade laws.”65 True to its word, in
2018, the United States plunged the global economy into a state of
nervous uncertainty by imposing unilateral, punitive tariffs of $250
billion on Chinese goods66 under U.S. trade laws without consulting
62
63
64
65
66

what

Id. at 2.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id.
Yoni Blumberg, Trump’s $250 billion in China tariffs are now in effect—here’s
could
get
more
expensive,
CNBC
(Sep.
25,
2018),
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with and in defiance of the rules of the WTO.67 China immediately
replied with retaliatory tariffs of $110 billion on U.S. goods68 setting
the stage for a drawn out and destructive trade war, the full
repercussions of which are yet to be determined.
B. China’s Accession to the WTO and Its Obligation to Implement
Market Reforms
1.

China, the GATT, and Most Favored Nation Tariffs

As the crux of the U.S. grievance against China is its failure to
fulfill its commitments to dismantle the state sector of its economy,
we need to examine whether China made an explicit or implicit
promise to adopt these commitments. We can start this analysis by
examining the background and circumstances surrounding China’s
entry into the WTO. Although China was an original contracting
party in 1947 to a predecessor organization of the WTO, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), China withdrew from the
GATT in 1950.69 In the late 1940s, China was in the midst of internal
chaos and upheaval caused by a destructive civil war that erupted
soon after the end of the Second World War.70 With the strong
financial and military support of the United States, the Nationalist
government, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, had a tenuous grip on power
but soon became embroiled in a mortal conflict with the insurgent
communist forces led by Mao Zedong.71 Against great odds,72 Mao

https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/25/with-trumps-250-billion-in-china-tariffsheres-what-will-cost-more.html [https://perma.cc/HA6V-LN52].
67
Chow, United States Unilateralism, supra note 3.
68
Milton Ezrati, Trade War From the Chinese Side, FORBES (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2018/10/03/trade-war-from-thechinese-side/#141121296e10 [https://perma.cc/B735-BQPT].
69
Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Opposes Human Rights in the World Trade
Organization, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 61, 71 (2013) [hereinafter Chow, Human Rights in
the WTO].
70
Id. at 72.
71 See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 23, at 13.
72
Chiang had an army that was twice the size of the Communists at the
beginning of the conflict and also the advantage of American equipment and
backing. See Id. While Chiang had material advantages, he was unable to overcome
problems of incompetence in the field and corruption in command. Id.
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vanquished the Nationalist government to Taiwan.73 Mao then
focused the new nation’s energies on self-sufficiency, introspection,
and revolutionary ideals;74 Mao had no interest in international
engagement through trade but was focused on nation-building and
national purification instead.75 After several decades marked by
periods of calm interrupted by intermittent spasms of destructive
political purges and chaos, China finally turned outward and
focused on economic development in order to alleviate the abject
poverty that the nation still suffered from its founding in 1949
through the decade of the 1970s and for most of its history.76 As
China turned to trade, China found that it needed to join the
GATT/WTO in order to receive favorable tariffs from GATT/WTO
member nations and protections against discriminatory treatment.77
While China began negotiations for accession to the WTO in 1984,
China’s accession would not be completed until 2001.78 In the
meanwhile, China faced a serious hurdle in the form of high tariffs
on its goods from the United States, one of China’s most important
export markets.79
Imports from China enter the United States subject to the
imposition by U.S. Customs of tariffs under the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), a practice that still holds
today.80 The HTSUS contains two general categories of tariffs
applicable to imports that are set forth in two columns.81 In Column
1 are the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs, i.e. favorable tariff
rates that the United States applies to goods from other WTO

Id.
Chow, Human Rights in the WTO, supra note 69, at 72.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 73.
77
GATT/WTO members are entitled to the benefit of bound tariffs, i.e. tariffs
subject to ceilings under the GATT/WTO and to MFN treatment, i.e. the lowest
tariffs that a WTO member gives to any other nation. See General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), art. II:1(a)-(b) (tariff bindings) and art. I (MFN principle),
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
78
See Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Successfully Concludes
Negotiations
on
China’s
Entry
(Sept.
17,
2001),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/AG25-UJVL] (stating background information on China’s entry
into the GATT /WTO).
79
Chow, Human Rights in the WTO, supra note 69, at 75.
80
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note
4, at 137-38.
81
Id. at 138.
73
74
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members.82 All WTO members have the right to receive these tariffs
under the MFN principle contained in GATT Article I.83 As most
nations enjoy MFN tariffs under the HTSUS, the United States now
eschews the use of the term “MFN” since it implies favoritism and
instead uses the term “Normal Trade Relations” (NTR) to designate
those nations that receive the Column 1 tariff rates.84 Under Column
2 of the HTSUS are the old Smoot-Hawley85 tariff rates implemented
during the high tide of protectionism in the 1930s.86 Column 2 rates
are draconian, averaging 53 percent of the value of the import, and
were intended to prevent trade.87 Only a few pariah nations, such
as North Korea, Cuba, and Iran, receive these rates under the
HTSUS.88 In the 1990s, leading up to China’s WTO accession, China
Id.
Id. Article I of the GATT requires the United States to grant all WTO
members the most favorable tariff rates that it grants to any other nation,
irrespective of whether the nation is a WTO member. This means that if the United
States grants a low tariff rate to Country X then under the MFN principle the United
States must automatically and unconditionally grant the same low tariff rate to
every other WTO member. Countries are entitled to MFN treatment only if they
are members of the WTO or otherwise have a treaty with the United States
requiring MFN treatment. The availability of MFN treatment serves as an
inducement for countries to join the GATT/WTO. See GATT, supra note 77, art. I.
See also CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 44, at 150.
84
Id.
85
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. ch. 4 (1930).
86
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note
4, at 138-40.
87
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 44, at 18.
88
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note
4, at 138-40 (discussing North Korea and Cuba as rogue states). North Korea, Iran,
and Cuba are subject to numerous additional U.S. sanction regimes that impose
independent restrictions limiting or preventing trade aside from Column 2 tariffs.
In the case of North Korea, these sanction regimes include the National
Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1655 (1976); International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (2007); North Korean Sanctions and
Policy enhancement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-122, 130 Stat. 93 (2016); and Section
5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, ch. 583, 59 Stat. 620 (1945). In the
case of Cuba, these other regimes include the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7211 (2000); Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22
U.S.C. ch. 69 §§ 6001-6010 (1992); Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. ch. 53 §§
4301-4341 (1917); and Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of
1966, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. (1966). In the case of Iran, these regimes include
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010); Iran Freedom
and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 2004 (2013);
and Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44,
131 Stat. 886 (2017).
82
83
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was also subject to the Column 2 Smoot-Hawley rates since it was
not a WTO member and did not have a bilateral trade treaty with
the United States granting MFN treatment.89
In order to obtain MFN or NTR tariffs from the United States,
China needed to obtain congressional approval on an annual basis
subject to a review of China’s human rights record.90 In 1971, the
United States had passed the Jackson-Vanik amendment as part of
the Trade Act of 1974 to pressure the Soviet Union to allow the
emigration of Soviet Jews to the United States or Israel.91 The United
States could approve MFN treatment for the Soviet Union based
upon an annual certification of compliance or a presidential waiver
excusing the application of the statute due to progress in the area of
human rights.92 As the Jackson-Vanik amendment was drafted in
general terms, the United States began to apply the amendment to
China on an annual basis in determining whether to grant MFN
treatment for Chinese goods.93 Congress had to “approve” China’s
human rights record each year as a condition of granting MFN
tariffs.94
China’s annual approval process for MFN treatment soon
became a lurid spectacle of “China bashing” in which Congress
scolded China for its poor human rights record and lectured China
on how to cure its many deficiencies, only to approve MFN status

89
See Chow, Human Rights in the WTO, supra note 69, at 77-78 (explaining that
because of its status as a non-GATT party state, China would receive the higher
Column 2 Smoot-Hawley tariff rates unless it received an annual certificate of
compliance with the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 or a
presidential waiver therefor).
90
See id. at 77 (“[T]he United States agreed to extend the GATT rates to China
based upon an annual approval of MFN status by the U.S. President. This approval
was conditioned on an annual review of China’s human rights record.” (footnotes
omitted)).
91
The Jackson-Vanik amendment was enacted into law as part of Title IV of
the 1974 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 93-617, 88 Stat. 1978, signed into law on Jan. 3, 1975
by President Gerald Ford. The amendment was designed to pressure the Soviet
Union to allow ease of emigration for Jews. See Thomas J. Probert, The Innovation of
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY 323
(Brendan Simms & D.J.B. Trim eds., 2011) (describing the history of the
amendment’s passage).
92
Chow, Human Rights in the WTO, supra note 69, at 77.
93
See id. at 77-78 (describing how because the amendment uses general
language, its application is not limited to any particular country).
94
Id. at 79 (describing the process by which Congress and the president would
conduct annual approval and grant China its waiver).
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for China year after year.95 For its part, China, in the role of the
contrite supplicant, endured this humiliating process in stoic silence
and, in response to U.S. demands, made a few symbolic human
rights gestures in order to obtain MFN status.96 To avoid having to
suffer through this painful and degrading annual ritual, China
sought to become a member of the WTO, which would grant MFN
status as a matter of right.97 In addition, China’s accession to the
WTO would add much-needed predictability and certainty for its
export trade by grounding MFN on a permanent legal basis and not
on the whims of grandstanding U.S. politicians.98 Once China
became a WTO member, then China would be entitled to MFN
tariffs from the United States as a matter of right under the WTO,
and the Jackson-Vanik amendment would become irrelevant.
2.

Clinton’s Vision of China and the WTO

China found a strong supporter of its cause in President Bill
Clinton, who viewed China’s WTO membership as an agent of
potentially profound and positive change in China.99 In urging
congressional approval for the granting of permanent MFN status
to China as a result of its accession to the WTO, President Clinton
argued that WTO membership would encourage positive political

95
See James A. Dorn, Time to Repeal the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, CATO INST.
(Jul. 14, 1999), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-repealjacksonvanik-amendment [https://perma.cc/5PZL-SMLT] (arguing that the
annual recertification process has been used too often to bash China).
96
See The Associated Press, China Releases 3 Prisoners in Gesture to U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 5, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/05/world/chinareleases-3-prisoners-in-gesture-to-us.html
[https://perma.cc/68RE-USWD]
(relaying how China released three political prisoners in a political gesture to obtain
MFN treatment from the United States).
97
Every member of the GATT/WTO has a right to MFN treatment under
GATT, Article I. GATT, supra note 77, art. I.
98
Id.
99
Eric Schmitt & Joseph Kahn, The China Trade Vote: A Clinton Triumph; House,
in 237-197 Vote, Approves Normal Trade Rights for China, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/25/world/china-trade-vote-clintontriumph-house-237-197-vote-approves-normal-trade-rights.html
[https://perma.cc/ZY5C-RVMS] [hereinafter Schmitt & Kahn] (explaining how
President Clinton “threw the powers of the presidency” behind the bill to approve
normal trade rights for China).
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reforms in China, including greater protections for human rights.100
Although negotiations for China’s WTO accession had started
during the Presidency of Ronald Regan, China’s entry into the WTO
would be a major achievement, and Clinton was eager to have this
event occur before the end of his presidency.101 Addressing these
concerns in a major speech on March 9, 2000 at Johns Hopkins
University, Clinton made an explicit link between China’s accession
to the WTO and a commitment to adopt open market-oriented
policies:
By joining the W.T.O., China is not simply agreeing to import
more of our products; it is agreeing to import one of
democracy’s most cherished values: economic freedom. The
more China liberalizes its economy, the more fully it will
liberate the potential of its people . . . . And when individuals
have the power[] not just to dream but to realize their
dreams, they will demand a greater say.102
Clinton then made a critical link between economic freedom and
political freedom:
There’s something even more revolutionary at work here.
By lowering the barriers that protect state-owned industries,
China is speeding a process that is removing government
from vast areas of people’s lives . . . . [China] will have fewer
instruments . . . with which to control people’s lives. And
that may lead to very profound change . . . . [China] will find
that the genie of freedom will not go back into the bottle. As
Justice Earl Warren once said, liberty is the most contagious
force in the world . . . . I understand that this is not in and of
itself a human-rights policy. But still, it is likely to have a
profound impact on human rights and political liberty.103
Clinton’s reasoning is that by joining the WTO, China agreed to
adopt “economic freedom” in the form of free markets; as a result,
China would dismantle the state sector, and that would lead to
political reform that would protect human rights. According to
100
Id. (describing President Clinton’s argument that rejecting permanent
MFN status “would undercut China’s reformers”).
101
Id.
102
President Bill Clinton, Speech on China Trade Bill (Mar. 9, 2000),
https://www.iatp.org/sites/default/files/Full_Text_of_Clintons_Speech_on_Chi
na_Trade_Bi.htm [https://perma.cc/K2HL-HH94] [hereinafter Clinton].
103
Id.
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Clinton, China could undergo nothing less than an economic and
political revolution with its WTO accession and might even shed the
shackles of communism in favor of democracy.104 Clinton dangled
the prospect of democratic reform in China as the ultimate prize of
China’s entry into the WTO and congressional approval of
permanent MFN or NTR status for China. The liberation of China
from Communism would rectify one of the United States’ most
bitter disappointments of the Second World War when Mao Zedong
and his guerilla communist forces overthrew the U.S.-backed
government of Chiang Kai-Shek.105 This catastrophe was portrayed
by Congress and the press at the time as the “loss of China” to
communism and is referenced by Clinton at the beginning of his
speech.106 For Clinton, the personal and professional stakes were
high because China’s potential embrace of democracy would be a
crowning achievement for his presidency.107
In retrospect, these arguments seem to be illusory and quixotic,
but at the time, a highly skilled politician marshaled them effectively
before Congress and the American public.
Whether these
arguments are the result of wishful thinking or the expedient tactics
of a crafty politician remains unclear. But this line of argument was
repeatedly made by the Clinton Administration to gain political
support for the congressional grant of permanent MFN or NTR
status to China and appeared to gain currency within U.S. political
discourse.108 This line of argument by Clinton appears to be the
104
See, e.g., Press Release, White House, The U.S.-China WTO Agreement Will
Help Promote Reform, Accountability, and Openness in China (Mar. 8, 2000),
https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/html/20000308_2.html.
[perma.cc/VN7C-LBJV] (providing several optimistic statements of potential
political change in China from persons described as “Democracy and Human
Rights Activists”).
105
See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 23, at 13 (describing the loss
America felt when China fell to communism after hoping that it would become a
democracy in Asia to counterbalance the Soviet Union).
106
Id. (“The loss of China to communism triggered a wave of bitter
recriminations in the United States.”); Clinton, supra note 102 (“At the dawn of the
Cold War, when I was a young boy beginning to study such things, it was a cudgel
in a political battle: ‘Who lost China?’”).
107
Schmitt & Kahn, supra note 99 (stating that President Clinton considered
the passage of the bill to be “a crowning foreign policy triumph” of his presidency).
108
One indication of the extent to which Clinton’s line of reasoning has gained
acceptance in U.S. political discourse is that in 2017, Congress was still insisting that
China’s entry into the WTO came with commitments by China of political reforms
and the development of the rule of law. See Hearing on The Broken Promises of China’s
WTO Accession: Reprioritizing Human Rights Before the Congressional-Executive
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genesis of the myth that China agreed to implement market reforms
upon entry into the WTO.
3.

China’s Views of Needed Reforms for the WTO

In response to Clinton’s grandiose vision of its future, a cautious
China said nothing and made no bold promises. A perusal of
China’s WTO accession documents does not disclose any promises
to dismantle the state sector and adopt open markets. In its Protocol
of Accession, the formal document approved by the WTO that sets
forth the specific terms and conditions of China’s accession, there is
not one mention of a commitment by China to adopt open market
reforms.
The Protocol of Accession contains specific WTO
obligations, including the publication of laws, regulations, and other
measures affecting trade in goods, services, or intellectual property
rights;109 the elimination of all taxes and charges applied to
exports;110 and implementation of specific commitments in a
schedule on agricultural products.111 These are specific, concrete,
and technical commitments that are legally binding, but China made
no promises to introduce sweeping macro-economic policies or to
dismantle the state sector.
China’s expectations on its needed reforms as part of joining the
WTO are discussed in the Working Party Report, which is a record
of the negotiations between China, the United States, and other
WTO members on China’s accession.112 The Working Party Report
is not legally binding except for Paragraph 342 (itself referring to
numerous specific commitments), which was expressly
incorporated in the Protocol of Accession.113 Otherwise, the
Working Party Report is useful as a historical record in providing
context and background for China’s expectations in joining the
WTO, explained as follows:

Commission on China, 115th Cong. 42 (2017) (statement of Michael R. Wessel,
Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission) (stating
that China had made commitments “in conjunction with the 1997 handover”).
109
China Protocol of Accession, supra note 5, art. 2(C)(1).
110
Id. art. 11(3).
111
Id. art. 12(1).
112
China Working Party Report, supra note 6.
113
China Protocol of Accession, supra note 5, art. 1(2) (incorporating
Paragraph 342).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/2

2020]

The Myth of China's Open Market Reforms

961

In statements to the GATT 1947 Working Party and
subsequently to the Working Party on the Accession of
China, the representative of China stated that China’s
consistent efforts to resume its status as a contracting party
to GATT and accession to the WTO Agreement were in line
with its objective of economic reform to establish a socialist
market economy as well as its basic national policy of
opening to the outside world. China’s WTO accession
would increase its economic growth and enhance its
economic and trade relations with WTO Members.114
The Working Party Report indicates that China had an
“objective of economic reform to establish a social market economy”
as part of an overall objective of trading with the rest of the world.115
The concept of a socialist market economy, however, is not new to
China’s WTO accession. According to China’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, China has been developing a socialist market economy since
the beginning of economic reforms in 1978.116 Today, the concept of
a socialist market economy is fundamental to China. As embodied
in Article 6 of the PRC Constitution:
The basis of the socialist economic system of the People’s
Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means
of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and
collective ownership by the working people . . . . In the
primary stage of socialism, the State upholds the basic
economic system in which the public ownership is dominant
and diverse forms of ownership develop side by side.117
The PRC Constitution makes it clear that in a socialist market
economy, the state-led sector plays a dominant role. Article 7 of the
PRC Constitution states: “The State-owned economy, namely, the
socialist economy under ownership by the whole people, is the
China Working Party Report, supra note 6, at para. 4.
Id.
116
See The Socialist Market Economy: Introduction, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC
OF
CHINA,
OF
THE
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ljzg_665465/zgjk_665467/3582_665489/t17
865.shtml [https://perma.cc/8KJB-D6F4] (describing how “commodity, capital,
labor service and technology markets have appeared one after the other in China”
since 1978, transforming the planned economy system into a socialist market
economy, and asserting that this transformation has strengthened the market’s
regulatory function “tremendously”).
117
XIANFA art. 6 (2004) (China).
114
115
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leading force in the national economy. The State ensures the
consolidation and growth of the State-owned economy.”118
These official sources indicate that by “socialist market
economy,” China means that it will have a hybrid economy: stateled, with free-market features, and SOEs playing a decisive role.
This concept is embedded in the PRC Constitution and has been
recognized as guiding the country since 1978. These sources
indicate that China’s own views of its obligations to reform its
economy as part of its accession to the WTO are far removed from
the U.S.-described efforts of China’s obligation to adopt a market
economy. The grandiose vision of a China in which economic
reform would lead inevitably to political reform and the growth of
democracy was invented by Clinton and then accepted by
subsequent U.S. administrations, including the current
administration of President Trump.
C. The WTO and Open Market-Oriented Policies
Even if China never promised to adopt open-market reforms,
China would be under a legal obligation to do so if any of the
relevant WTO legal documents created such an obligation. To
understand China’s commitments, we now examine the immediate
legal consequences of China’s entry into the WTO. Under Article
XII(1) of the Marrakesh Agreement on Establishing the WTO,119 China
acceded to the WTO pursuant to its Protocol of Accession, which
committed China to abide by the multilateral agreements of the
WTO, i.e., the GATT (1994)120 covering trade in goods, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)121 covering trade in
services, and the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property

Id. art. 7.
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7; see also Protocols of accession for new
members since 1995, including commitments in goods and services, WTO (last visited
(Apr.
11,
2020),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
acc_e/completeacc_e.htm [https://perma.cc/LJ8Y-7BPB] (containing an official
record of China’s accession to the Marrakesh Agreement).
120
GATT, supra note 77; see also China Protocol of Accession, supra note 5.
121
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S.
183,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S25Y-U6BH].
118
119
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(TRIPS)122 covering trade in technology. A perusal of all of these
agreements and their corollary agreements,123 including a
description of general goals and policies contained in their
preambles, shows no mention of a requirement to adopt open
market-oriented reforms. Rather, these agreements contain specific
obligations, many of them technical in nature.
The only WTO document supporting the U.S. position is the
Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 1994 marking the conclusion of
the Uruguay Round of negotiations that established the WTO. In its
preamble, the Marrakesh Declaration states that nations had
participated in the Uruguay Round of negotiations “based upon
open, market-oriented policies.”124 In its 2017 Report on China WTO
Compliance to Congress, the USTR specifically quotes this language
in the Marrakesh Declaration as the source of China’s obligation to
adopt open market-oriented reforms.125
The Marrakesh Declaration was issued by the highest decisionmaking body of the WTO, the Ministerial Conference, consisting of
trade ministers from all members.126 The Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the WTO refers in numerous instances to the
Ministerial Council127 and its decision-making powers, but while the
Agreement describes the legally binding nature of decisions issued
by the Ministerial Conference, it never mentions declarations. The
Marrakesh Agreement makes it clear that the Ministerial Conference
has the power to make “decisions” on all matters involving the WTO
agreements “in accordance with the specific requirements for
decision-making in this Agreement and in the relevant Multilateral
Trade Agreement.”128 The Marrakesh Agreement sets forth the
122
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SQP-ZK5C].
123
The GATT has twelve corollary agreements, including agreements dealing
with agriculture, anti-dumping duties and subsidies, technical barriers to trade, and
sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures; these are set forth in Annex 1A of the
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7.
124
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7.
125
2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
126
The Ministerial Conference meets every two years. See CHOW &
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 44, at 28.
127
The Ministerial Council is also known as the General Council. It is the
standing body of all of the trade ministers of WTO members who have permanent
offices at the WTO headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. Id.
128
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7, art. IV:1.
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voting requirements for a decision but not for a declaration.129 A
Ministerial decision can affect rights under the WTO multilateral
agreements by interpreting those agreements.130 Article XVI of the
Marrakesh Agreement states: “Except as otherwise provided under
this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO
shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary
practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947
and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947.”131
By contrast, a Ministerial declaration has no legal authority. This
was made clear by the WTO panel in U.S.—Lead and Bismuth II,
which explained:
A Ministerial Declaration is a mere “Declaration,” rather
than a “Decision” of the Ministers; a Declaration lacks the
mandatory authority of a Decision; in the Ministerial
Declaration, Ministers simply “recognize . . . the need” for
the consistent resolution of disputes; the simple recognition
of the need for an action does not mandate the action; in a
Ministerial Decision, by contrast, Ministers “decide” that
certain action shall be taken.132
The one textual support in the WTO for the U.S. position that
China has an obligation to adopt “open, market-oriented policies” is
a non-binding statement in a ceremonial declaration issued to mark
the end of the Uruguay Round of negotiations; the statement may
be aspirational in nature, but it is not mandatory according to WTO
jurisprudence. This is hardly adequate legal support for the U.S.
claim that China has failed to fulfill its commitments to replace its
state-led sector with an open-market economy.

129
Id. art. IX:1 (“Decisions of the Ministerial Conference…shall be taken by a
majority of the votes cast, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement or in the
relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement”).
130
Id. art. IV:1.
131
Id. art. XVI.
132
Panel Report, United States—Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain
Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom,
WTO
Doc.
WT/DS138/9/Corr.1
(June
27,
2000),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symb
ol=%20wt/ds138/*)&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&lang
uageUIChanged=true# [https://perma.cc/26A2-SBGF].
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III. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE STATE-LED ECONOMY
A. China’s SOEs in the New Millennium
The United States claims that it has, for the past fifteen years,
engaged in good-faith negotiations with China, encouraging the
state to follow through on its WTO obligations to dismantle its stateled sector of the economy.133 An examination of the recent history
of China’s industrial policies reveals that China has never indicated
that it would abandon the state sector, but rather has consistently
adopted policies to streamline and strengthen the state sector.
After the watershed year of 1978, as China shifted its focus from
revolutionary ideals to economic development and foreign trade,134
China’s policy makers faced the daunting task of reforming its
massive state sector led by SOEs.135 The Party had to address the
problem of persistent financial losses that SOEs suffered year after
year, which were a major drain on the economy.136 By 1997, China
had adopted a policy of selling off less vital SOEs to the private
sector and focusing on supporting a smaller set of SOEs in strategic
industrial sectors.137 This policy was Zhua Da Fang Xiao—”manage
the large and let go the small.”138 Although SOEs made up a smaller
part of the economy as a result of these reforms, SOEs were
maintained in all vital sectors of the economy, including banking,
telecommunications, air and rail travel, steel and metals, oil and gas
exploration and production, and electricity and water supply.139
133
2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. (“U.S. policymakers hoped that the
terms set forth in China’s Protocol of Accession would dismantle existing state-led
policies and practices that were incompatible with an international trading system
expressly based on open, market-oriented policies and rooted in the principles of
nondiscrimination, market access, reciprocity, fairness and transparency. But those
hopes were disappointed.”).
134
See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 23, at 26-27 (explaining how
following Mao’s death in 1976, China “turned its attention to rebuilding [its] long[]neglected economy”).
135
See id. at 29 (explaining the policies that China enacted to grant SOEs
independent legal status and wean them off state subsidies).
136
See id. at 26 (“[China’s] inefficient and poorly managed state sector resulted
in the bulk of China’s economy operating at a loss.”).
137
See Beijing rules: China’s state-owned enterprises, ECONOMIST (May 1, 1997),
http://www.economist.com/node/148434 [https://perma.cc/F2TT-6BER].
138
Id.
139
CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 23, at 24.
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In 2003, only two years after China’s accession to the WTO, the
Party took a major step in increasing its control over SOEs when it
established the State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (“SASAC”).140
The SASAC is a central level
government agency that serves as the controlling shareholder of all
SOEs in China,141 allowing China to consolidate control over all
SOEs in one entity. More than merely a holding company, the
SASAC also actively manages its SOEs.142 The SASAC is perhaps
the most powerful holding company in the world, controlling more
than half of the Chinese SOEs on the global Fortune 500.143 Also in
2003, China established a second central level entity, Central Huijin
Investment Ltd. (CHI), to increase its control over China’s banks.144
The CHI serves as the controlling shareholder of China’s banks, the
lifeblood of the massive financial sector.145 China’s top four largest
commercial banks—the Bank of China, the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, and the
Agricultural Bank of China—are larger than any U.S., European, or
Japanese bank.146 As in the case of SASAC, CHI is not only a holding
company but is an active manager of these banks.147 Together, the
SASAC and CHI allow the state to control China’s industrial and
financial sectors, creating a firm grip over China’s economy.148 SOEs
implement the Party’s initiatives in the industrial sector, and banks
support SOEs by making loans to them under Party direction.149
In 2006, China announced a set of indigenous innovation policies
designed to propel the nation forward in its race to become more
globally competitive.150 Although announced in 2006, these policies
140
Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV.
J. INT’L L. 261, 271 (2016).
141
Id.
142
Id. at 272.
143
Id. at 271.
144
Id. at 274.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 273.
147
Id. at 274.
148
Id. at 272, 274.
149
Id.
150
See China: Intellectual Property Infringement, Indigenous Innovation
Policies, and Frameworks for Measuring the Effects on the U.S. Economy, Inv. No.
332-514,
USITC
Pub.
4199
(amended)
at
5-1
(Nov.,
2010),
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GLV2-SBTY] [hereinafter United States International Trade
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had antecedents in policies beginning in 1986 when the basic goals
were first formulated.151 These indigenous innovation policies were
a web of practices, policies, and measures designed to encourage the
use of locally produced technology (i.e., IPR) and to wean China off
the use of foreign-sourced technology.152 Among the most
controversial of these policies were government-procurement
policies that favored the purchase of products with indigenous
innovation over products with foreign-sourced technology.153 The
stated goal of these policies was to produce “national champion”
companies, i.e., SOEs that could compete effectively with
U.S.
multinational companies in international business.154
companies have claimed that these policies discriminated against
U.S. multinationals in China, and the United States has continuously
pressured China to reform them.155
Coinciding with the announcement of its indigenous innovation
policies, China began an aggressive expansion of business
conducted by SOEs abroad by entering into trade agreements with
mostly developing countries including Chile (2006), Pakistan (2006
and 2009), Singapore (2009), and Costa Rica (2010).156 China also
entered into several multilateral trade agreements, including the
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (2005) (China, Bangladesh, India,
Laos, South Korea, and Sri Lanka)157 and the Framework Agreement
on Economic Cooperation with South East Asian Nations (2010)
Commission Report] (“In recent years, China has introduced a number of policies
aimed at increasing the level of scientific and technological innovation originating
within the country.”).
151
See id. at 5-2 (“[M]any observers note that promoting innovation and
technological development has long been an important theme for the Chinese
government.”).
152
Id. at 5-3.
153
Daniel C.K. Chow, China’s Indigenous Innovation Policies and the World Trade
Organization, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 81, 83 (2013) [hereinafter Chow, Indigenous
Innovation Policies].
154
United States International Trade Commission Report, supra note 150, 5-6.
155
Chow, Indigenous Innovation Policies, supra note 153, at 84-85.
156
China maintains a website with its foreign trade agreements. See CHINA
FTA
NETWORK,
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml
[https://perma.cc/3ALX-YKXL] (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).
157
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Comm’n for Asia and the Pacific, Amendment to the
First Agreement on Trade Negotiations among Developing Member Countries of
the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok
Agreement),
Asia-Pacific
Trade
Agreement
(Nov.
2,
2005),
https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/02_Amendment%20to%20Bangko
k%20Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/H784-U7CT].
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(China, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and other nations).158
These agreements pave the way for SOEs to expand their operations
in foreign countries under terms that do not contain restrictions
related to workers’ rights, labor conditions, and the environment.159
The lack of these constraints allow SOEs from China to operate with
lower costs than multinational companies from the United States
that are subject to myriad constraints on their behavior under U.S.
treaties and federal law.160 In 2016, China established the Asia
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to serve as a rival to the U.S.backed World Bank.161 A major purpose of the AIIB is to provide
funding for major infrastructure projects in Asian countries that will
be implemented by China’s SOEs.162 In other words, China will lend
money through the AIIB to foreign countries who will then use the
funds to pay China’s SOEs to implement infrastructure projects.
In 2013, at the conclusion of the Third Plenum of the Communist
Party, the Party reaffirmed its support of SOEs when it announced
that it would “incessantly strengthen [the] vitality” of SOEs.163 The
Party reiterated its support for SOEs for the near future—up to 2025
and beyond—when in 2015, China announced a major new policy
initiative, “Made in China 2025.”164 This initiative advances themes
proposed by the indigenous innovation policies announced in
158
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation
Between the Association of South East Asian nations and the People’s Republic of
China
(Nov.
4,
2002),
https://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/
archive/ASEAN-China.pdf [https://perma.cc/2459-UCCL].
159
Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Promotes Its State-Owned Enterprises at the
Expense of Multinational Companies in China and Other Countries, 41 N.C. J. INT’L L.
455, 486-87 (2016) [hereinafter Chow, How China Promotes its SOEs].
160
Id. at 487.
161
Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment
Bank, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1255, 1256, 1258-59 (2016).
162
Id. at 1293-94 (explaining that “China can promote SOEs by using the AIIB
to make loans to developing countries to fund infrastructure projects that will be
implemented by SOEs. In other words, China may use the AIIB to lend money to
other countries to buy Chinese goods and services from SOEs.”).
163
Bob Davis & Brian Spegele, State Companies Emerge as Winners Following Top
China Meeting: Enterprises Fended Off Calls to Curb Their Influence, WALL STREET J.
(Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-companies-emerge-aswinners-following-top-china-meeting-1384352718
[https://perma.cc/RU5WSDFP].
164
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MADE IN CHINA 2025: GLOBAL AMBITIONS BUILT
ON
LOCAL PROTECTIONS, 6 (2017), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/
default/files/final_made_in_china_2025_report_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EJRKYCV].
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2006.165 Under Made in China 2025, the goal is for China to move
further up the value and technology chain and become a leader in
global manufacturing.166 Among the ten industries singled out for
development under Made in China 2025 are advanced information
technology, aerospace and aviation equipment, advanced rail
equipment, biomedicine and high-performance medical devices,
and agricultural machinery.167 Made in China 2025 envisions a
three-part strategy: localize innovation, replace foreign-sourced
technology with locally created technology, and capture domestic
and international market share in the ten strategic industries.168 In
2016, China once again reiterated the leadership role of SOEs in a
national meeting on building the role of the Party within SOEs.169
President Xi emphasized the role of the SOE as an instrumentality
of the Party and announced that Party leadership and increasing the
role of the Party are “the root and soul” of SOEs.170
These developments indicate that after China’s accession to the
WTO in 2001, China has regularly adopted major policy initiatives
that strengthened the Party’s grip over the economy and has
announced plans for SOEs to become leaders in global business. The
Party has sought to further embed itself in SOEs to the point where
the two now seem to be fused together.
B. Party Control of the Economy through the State Sector
The Party is able to exercise pervasive control over SOEs and,
through SOEs, all vital sectors of China’s economy. Within SOEs,
organizational structures allow the Party to exercise control at the
management level but also in the day-to-day affairs of the
company.171 Within each SOE, there are two parallel management
Id. at App. 1.F (listing “Overlapping Plans”).
Id. at 9.
167
Id. at 6.
168
Id. at 13.
169
See Xi stresses CPC leadership of state-owned enterprises, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 12,
2016), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-10/12/content_27035822.htm
[https://perma.cc/V52X-3LVE] (“Efforts should be made to strengthen and
improve Party leadership, as well as to build the role of the Party in SOEs to make
them the most trustworthy and reliable forces of the CPC and the state, said Xi.”).
170
Id.
171
See Chow, How China Promotes its SOEs, supra note 159, at 468 (describing
the two parallel management structures of SOEs).
165
166
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structures: one is the corporate management structure consisting of
a chief executive officer, one or more vice chief executive officers, a
chief accounting officer, and a board of directors.172 This type of
management structure is similar to corporate organizations in the
United States. A second parallel structure is the Party organization:
the Party structure consists of a secretary of the Party (the highest
position), several deputy secretaries, and a secretary of the
Discipline Inspection Commission (the word “Discipline” is a
surrogate for the more threatening sounding “corruption”).173 Each
person who holds a position in the corporate management structure
simultaneously holds a position of equal rank within the Party
structure, with the Party position as the more powerful.174 As the
Party organization must meet regularly, Party members are able to
carry out the directives of the Party at the enterprise management
level and also at the level of day-to-day operations.175 This structure
also exists at all levels of the government (central, provincial, and
local).176 This is the key structure through which the Party controls
the State. The supervision of the SASAC, discussed above, helps to
ensure that Party management of SOEs is consistent across
industrial sectors. The SASAC regularly rotates personnel between
the SASAC and SOEs.177 This rotation deepens the cooperation
between the SOEs and the state.178
SOEs are more than just important economic actors in China.
SOEs also serve as the mechanism by which the Party is able to
exercise pervasive control over the economy. Given this role,
dismantling SOEs would mean that the Party would relinquish
significant power. Instead of dismantling SOEs, the Party promotes
and protects them.179

172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 469.
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C. Party Control and Personal Wealth
A consequence of the Party’s control of the economy is that
members of the Party have been able to acquire immense personal
wealth despite modest official salaries.180 In 2012, the New York
Times published an article detailing the personal and family wealth
of Wen Jiabao, then China’s Premier,181 often portrayed in the media
as a benevolent figure known as “Uncle Wen.”182 The article details
a Wen family fortune worth $2.7 billion with holdings in
telecommunications, real estate, and insurance.183 Wen’s 90-year old
mother alone had $120 million in investments in an insurance
company.184 The article notes that Wen’s family fortunes soared off
the charts after his elevation to power as premier.185 In 2014, after
an investigation of Zhou Yongkang, a former Minister of Public
Security and senior Party member, China seized assets worth $14.5
billion from Zhou’s family and associates.186 Some of this wealth is
ostentatious. The disgraced former senior Party member Bo Xilai’s
holdings included a multi-million-dollar lakeside villa in Cannes,
Southern France.187

180
Xi Jinping, for example, earns about $22,000 a year as the President of
China. Lily Kuo, Does Chinese president Xi Jinping really earn just $22,000 a year?,
QUARTZ (Jan. 20, 2015), https://qz.com/329584/does-chinese-president-xi-jinpingreally-earn-just-22000-a-year/
[https://perma.cc/MUM5-XT8E]
(discussing
widespread perception that Party officials are corrupt).
181
David Barboza, Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
25,
2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/
business/global/family-of-wen-jiabao-holds-a-hidden-fortune-in-china.html
[https://perma.cc/ZWB6-QT5N].
182
See, e.g., Dhara Ranasinghe, Expose on Wen Jiabao’s Wealth—Storm in a
Teacup?, CNBC (Nov. 11, 2012), https://www.cnbc.com/id/49719053
[https://perma.cc/4PXA-XEJU] (describing a potential scandal where many of
Wen’s relatives “became extraordinarily wealthy during the premier’s term in
office”).
183
Barboza, supra note 181.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Benjamin Kang Lim & Ben Blanchard, Exclusive: China seizes $14.5 billion
assets from family, associates of ex-security chief: sources, WORLD NEWS (Mar. 30, 2014),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-corruption-zhou/exclusive-chinaseizes-14-5-billion-assets-from-family-associates-of-ex-security-chief-sourcesidUSBREA2T02S20140330 [https://perma.cc/7U6R-B4Q8].
187
Yao Meng, Bo Xilai’s Cannes villa goes on sale, GLOBAL TIMES (Dec. 22, 2014),
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/898165.shtml
[https://perma.cc/QNM2NX3Q] (stating that Bo’s villa was put on sale for $8.52 million).
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In 2013, with his ascension to power as President, Xi Jinping
launched a major crackdown on corruption.188 As of 2018, the
crackdown has punished an astonishing 1.5 million corrupt Party
officials.189 Critics of Xi, however, argue that his anti-corruption
campaign is motived not by altruistic goals but by a desire to root
out his enemies and consolidate his power.190 In 2018, riding a wave
of popularity due in part to his stance against corruption in the
Party, Xi was able to remove term limits on his presidency, allowing
him to serve for life.191 Critics further argue that corruption is built
into the structure of China’s governing institutions and that Xi’s goal
is not to wipe out corruption but to manage it for his own political
purposes.192 According to these observers, Xi shows little interest in
making the types of institutional reforms that would truly root out
and eliminate corruption.193 It appears to be likely that Party
members—at least those not out of favor with Xi—may be able to
continue to amass and retain private fortunes. For example, Wen
never faced any consequences after the New York Times exposé about
his family wealth. Instead, the Party was infuriated by the Times
article and punished the New York Times by blocking it from China’s
websites,194 a ban that remains in effect to this day, more than six
years later. Another prominent example is Xi himself, whose family

188
Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China’s Crackdown on Commercial Bribery Threatens
U.S. Multinational Companies Doing Business in China, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 511,
518 (2014) (describing Xi’s crackdown efforts and his view that corruption “could
kill the Party and ruin the country”).
189
Eric Baculinao, China’s President Xi beefs up his anti-corruption crackdown,
NBC NEWS (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/china-spresident-xi-beefs-his-anti-corruption-crackdown-n851491
[https://perma.cc/ZEP6-AD59].
190
See, e.g., David Skidmore, Understanding Chinese President Xi’s anticorruption
campaign,
CONVERSATION
(Oct.
27,
2017),
http://theconversation.com/understanding-chinese-president-xis-anticorruption-campaign-86396 [https://perma.cc/GJ5M-KMHU] (arguing that Xi’s
campaign is motivated not by “his own rectitude” but rather by a desire to ensure
that only those who help him stay in power receive kickbacks).
191
China reappoints Xi Jinping as president with no term limit, GUARDIAN (Mar.
17,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/17/chinareappoints-xi-jinping-as-president-with-no-term-limit [https://perma.cc/P43L638P].
192
Skidmore, supra note 190.
193
Id.
194
See Keith Bradsher, China Blocks Web Access to Times After Article, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 25, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/world/asia/chinablocks-web-access-to-new-york-times.html [https://perma.cc/XR53-FE6J].
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has been able to accumulate over $1 billion in personal wealth,195
despite Xi’s very modest government salary.196 Although the
current anti-corruption campaign is noted for its intensity and
duration, most people in China continue to hold a cynical view of
Party members.197 SOEs are notoriously corrupt,198 and many
believe that Party officials at all levels are able to acquire wealth
through their positions and their control of SOES and the
economy.199
IV. CONCLUSION
The Trump Administration’s claim that the United States erred
in supporting China’s entry into the WTO is based upon a flawed
premise. This premise is that China made an explicit or implicit
commitment to dismantle its state-led economy in favor of
eventually establishing an open market economy. China never
made such a commitment and China is not otherwise bound by any
legal obligations found in the WTO to do so. Perhaps China is
“guilty” of allowing Clinton to trumpet the possibility of democratic
reform as a result of its accession to the WTO without correcting
him. If that is the extent of China’s culpability, then China has done
no more than take advantage of a wrong-headed opponent by
allowing him to reach the conclusions he wanted for political
reasons. If an error was involved, it was on the part of the United
States, which, due to wishful thinking, political expediency, or a
combination of both, falsely convinced itself that China made a
commitment to fully embrace open-market oriented reforms and
eventually dismantle the state sector of the economy.
Not only has China not retreated from a state-led economy,
China has been unwavering in strengthening it beginning shortly
after its accession to the WTO. A series of major policy initiatives,
declared with great fanfare and in plain sight starting shortly after
China’s accession, indicates that the Party has no intention of
abandoning China’s state-led economy but seeks to elevate it. China
Skidmore, supra note 190.
Xi’s official salary is $22,000 per year. See Kuo, supra note 180.
197
This observation is based on the author’s own discussions in China with
lawyers, academics, and citizens of China.
198
See Chow, How China Promotes its SOEs, supra note 159, at 488.
199
See Schmitt & Kahn, supra note 99.
195
196
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now has ambitious plans to lift its SOEs to the top level of
international competition in the most advanced industries in the
world by 2025. China also plans to further elevate and entrench the
role of the Party in SOEs. To believe that China will abandon the
state sector in light of these developments is pointless and naïve.
Such a belief also ignores the forces of Chinese history and tradition.
The Party is a devoted student of Chinese history, tradition, and
culture and China is a country that is perhaps more bound by these
forces than most. President Xi has stated that the “values and
spiritual world of the Chinese people have always been deeply
rooted in the fertile soil of China’s traditional culture.”200 Xi also
stated that “the Chinese Communist Party is the successor to and
promoter of fine traditional Chinese culture.”201 In the context of
Chinese culture, the Party sees its ascension to power in China in
heroic terms and as a matter of destiny.202 The PRC Constitution
states that after years of domination by foreign nations, China was
reduced to a “semi-colonial country”203 and waged many “heroic
struggles for national liberation and independence.”204 After
“protracted and arduous struggles . . . along a zig zag course”205 the
Communist Party led by Mao finally “overthrew the rule of
imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism”206 and achieved
“a great victory in the New-Democratic Revolution.”207 Through the
Party the Chinese people finally became the “masters of the
country.”208 The implication of the Constitution is that only the
Party was able to emerge from the chaos of the twentieth century to
save the Chinese people from foreign oppression and internal decay.
Like the emperors of China that preceded it, the Party seized
power through bloodshed and violent overthrow by vanquishing a
ruling government that had succumbed to moral corruption.209
Chinese history and philosophy teach that an emperor ruled
200
Jin Kai, The Chinese Communist Party’s Confucian Revival, DIPLOMAT (Sept.
30, 2014), https://thediplomat.com/2014/09/the-chinese-communist-partysconfucian-revival/[https://perma.cc/W8AQ-3FV7]
201
Id.
202
See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 23, at 121.
203
XIANFA, pmbl. (1982) (China).
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
See CHOW, LEGAL SYSTEM OF CHINA, supra note 23, at 120-21.
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through the “Mandate of Heaven” (i.e. legitimate power) and
continued in power until he lost it by descending into tyranny or
moral decay.210 At that point, a new leader with a new Mandate of
Heaven will appear to depose the sitting leader and assume the
throne.211 Every emperor of China held the Mandate of Heaven until
he was deposed.212 Just as throughout Chinese history the Mandate
of Heaven is never voluntarily relinquished but is forfeited, the
Party sees itself as holding onto the Mandate of Heaven until it is
forfeited.213 The notion that the Party will voluntarily abandon its
seat of power in favor of a democracy is naïve and against the tide
of Chinese history, culture, and philosophy in which the Party holds
a deep belief. Adding to the forces of tradition are also the deepest
tendencies of human nature. Party members enjoy great power and
personal wealth under the current system.214
The United States now admits that its efforts to push, prod, or
cajole China into adopting open market-oriented reforms within the
WTO have been largely futile. The Trump Administration seems to
have concluded that seeking China’s reform through the use of the
WTO, including its dispute settlement system, will be ineffective in
achieving open market-oriented reforms in China. Instead, the
United States has adopted an approach of imposing unilateral trade
sanctions on China outside of and in contravention of the WTO.215
This approach aims to coerce China into adopting changes that
China would not accept through WTO negotiations.216 China has
responded with indignation and defiance by imposing retaliatory
measures against the United States.217 Since President Trump first
imposed new tariffs on steel and aluminum from China and other
nations on March 23, 2018,218 the two protagonists have been locked
in a dangerous and escalating tit-for-tat tariff war.219
Id.
Id.
212
Id.
213 Id.
214
See supra Section III.C.
215
See Chow, United States Unilateralism, supra note 3.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
See Dorcas Wong & Alexander Chipman Koty, The U.S.-China Trade War: A
BRIEFING
(Feb.
26,
2020),
https://www.chinaTimeline,
CHINA
briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/78T2Y7J9].
219
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On January 20, 2020, the United States and China entered into
Phase One of the Economic and Trade Agreement between the
United States and China220 designed to resolve the trade dispute
between the two countries. Under Phase One, China made
numerous significant commitments in intellectual property
protection221 and dispute resolution222 and also committed to
purchase at least $200 billion in goods from the United States in the
next two years.223 What is significant about the Phase One
agreement is that it contains no obligations on the part of China to
reform its state-led economy.224 China rebuffed talks on this subject
during the Phase One negotiations.225 The United States hopes to
obtain concessions on this issue, the most difficult and intractable of
all in the two countries’ negotiations, for Phase Two of the
agreement to be reached in the next round of negotiations.226
Will these negotiations allow the United States to obtain a firm,
specific commitment from China to dismantle its state-led economy,
a goal that the United States could not achieve within the WTO?
Based on the discussions in this Article, the United States cannot be
optimistic. The United States can expect that China will continue to
rebuff talks on this subject. Even if China agrees to talks, it will be
220
Economic and Trade Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China
(“Economic Agreement between U.S. and China”), U.S.-China, Jan. 15, 2020,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreem
ent/Economic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between_The_United_States_And_China
_Text.pdf%20 [https://perma.cc/99SG-SGAT].
221
The entire first chapter deals with intellectual property protection and
imposes many new obligations on China. Chapter 2 deals with new obligations by
China relating to technology transfer, also related to intellectual property. See id. at
1-1 to 1-18 (intellectual property), 2-1 to 2-3 (technology transfer).
222
See id. at ch. 7 (allowing the United States to unilaterally impose trade
sanctions on China in the event of China’s failure to fulfill its obligation under the
Agreement and to prohibit China from adopting a counter-response); see also id. at
ch. 7.4:4(b), 7-3.
223
See id. art. 6.2 (“China shall ensure that purchases and imports into China
from the United States of the manufactured goods, agricultural goods, energy
products, and services identified in Annex 6.1 exceed the corresponding 2017
baseline amount by no less than $200 billion.”).
224
See Peter Eavis, et al., What’s In (and Not in) in the New U.S.-China Trade Deal,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/business/
economy/china-trade-deal-text.html [https://perma.cc/XT3F-MC2P] (noting that
the U.S. has “long had concerns about China’s use of industrial subsidies and stateowned enterprises to build up and dominate crucial industries” but “China
rebuffed talks on these subjects”).
225
Id.
226
Id.
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difficult to obtain firm commitments from China to dismantle its
state-led economy and any commitments obtained from China are
likely to be illusory. The Agreement contains a provision that allows
China to terminate it at any time by the submission of a notice of
withdrawal.227 The United States should be aware that China’s
strategy may be to agree to Phase Two just to avert a destructive
trade war, then delay the implementation of commitments, if any
are reached, to reform its state-led economy, and then to withdraw
from the Agreement once the simmering effects of the trade war
have passed and China is in a stronger position to resist further U.S.
attempts at intimidation. The negotiations of Phase Two and the
conclusion and implementation of the agreement bear careful
watching in the next several years to come.
At this point, let us be clear that there is nothing legally or
morally wrong with China’s choice of an economic or political
system. Despite the U.S. claims to the contrary there is no reason
why a sovereign nation that adopts a state-led economy over an
open market economy is in moral, legal, or historical error.228 Once
the U.S. claim that China has a legal obligation to adopt an open
market economy is debunked, China, like any other sovereign
nation, has the right and full freedom to adopt any economic or
political system that it sees fit regardless of criticism from the United
States.229 Other nations have the freedom to trade with China as they
wish or to enter into disputes over trade with China as they see fit.230
But in these disputes no nation, including the United States, has the
higher moral or legal ground.231
Frustrated with the lack of progress in dealing with China within
the WTO, the United States is now determined to work outside of
the WTO and deal with China directly through the use of economic

227
Economic Agreement between U.S. and China, supra note 220, art. 8.3:2
(stating that a notice of termination becomes effective 60 days after submission to
the other party or on any other on which the parties agree).
228
It is possible to derive these freedoms from the fundamental principle of
sovereign equality of nations as set forth in Article 2(1) of the Charter of the United
Nations, U.N. Charter art. 2(1), http://legal.un.org/repertory/art2.shtml
[https://perma.cc/HUX9-QMHP]. See also Hans Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign
Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization, 53 YALE L.J. 207 (1944).
229
See id.
230
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231
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might. 232 Despite the progress reached by concluding Phase One of
the Economic Agreement to end the trade war,233 the ability of the
United States to secure and enforce an obligation by China to
implement open market reforms through this process is far from
certain. Moreover, regardless of the effectiveness of the U.S
approach to China outside of the WTO, the United States must still
address the issue of what to do about China’s future in the WTO.
It should be clear that China’s status quo in the WTO is not
acceptable. The article has shown that the present approach of
coaxing China to adopt open market reforms in the WTO is futile,
traceable to a myth and a hopeful illusion. It should also be clear
that doing nothing is also not acceptable. China has been able to
exploit the benefits of its WTO membership to become dominant in
world trade with a state-led economy that cannot be reined in by the
rules of the WTO. China will only become more dominant in the
WTO and world trade if the United States does nothing.
At this point, the United States is realistically faced with only
two choices. The United States can seek to have China renegotiate
its terms of membership in the WTO and impose the type of effective
constraints that will allow the WTO to discipline China’s state-led
economy and control its WTO inconsistent practices.234 One
232 2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (“The notion that our problems with
China can be solved by bringing more cases at the WTO alone is naïve at best, and
at worst it distracts policymakers from facing the gravity of the challenge presented
by China’s non-market policies); see also Bob Davis, When the World Opened the Gates
of China, WALL STREET J. (July 27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-theworld-opened-the-gates-of-china-1532701482
[https://perma.cc/XT3F-MC2P]
(quoting Robert Lighthizer, the USTR, stating in reference to using economic
muscle against China, “Ultimately, that’s all you have anyway.”).
233
See supra text accompanying notes 220-26.
234
One need look no further than to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (hereinafter
“TPP”) for a set of legal constraints that are designed to reign in China’s state-led
economy. The TPP is a mega free-trade agreement with the United States and 11
Asian economies that was drafted by the United States with the primary goal of
limiting China’s state-led economy in international trade. See Daniel C.K. Chow,
How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific Partnership to Contain China in
International Trade, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 370, 374 (2017). The United States negotiated
the TPP but excluded China from the negotiations. Id. at 372. Once the TPP was
complete, the United States intended to give China a stark choice: join the TPP and
accept the restrictions on its state-led practices drafted with that purpose in mind
or ignore the TPP and lose the opportunities for increased trade in Asia. See id. at
372-75. After President Trump assumed office in January 2017, however, he
withdrew the United States from the TPP. See The United States Officially Withdraws
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Jan. 2017),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
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practical step to further this approach would be for an alliance of
countries, consisting of the United States, the European Union, and
Japan and others to bring a broad-based case in the WTO dispute
settlement system against China challenging its state-led
practices.235 The other choice is for China to exit the WTO. This
possibility seems unlikely without pressure, but it might be possible
to bring pressure on China within the WTO through the U.S.-EUJapan alliance to confront China with the choice to either reform or
exit. Both of these approaches have the advantage of squarely
raising the issue of what to do about China’s state-led economy
before the WTO membership. It is beyond the scope of this Article
to develop these paths more fully, but that is not this Article’s aim.
The present aim is to finally dispel the myth created by Clinton that
China will dismantle its state-led economy and adopt an open
market economy. It is imperative to understand that China will
remain a state-led economy so long as the Party is in power. By
accepting this sober realization, the United States can deal more
effectively in the future with China in the WTO, in bilateral trade
negotiations outside of the WTO, and beyond.

releases/2017/january/US-Withdraws-From-TPP
[https://perma.cc/5BGZAW53]. The remaining 11 states have indicated that they will form the TPP without
the United States, but the United States’ absence presents an opportunity for China,
which can now join the TPP without any nation having a keen interest in enforcing
the provisions directed against China. The United States withdrawal diminishes
the TPP, which can also benefit China by allowing it to dominate trade in Asia
through its competing free trade agreement, the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (to which the United States was not invited as a member),
and perhaps eventually trade throughout the world. For a fuller discussion of these
issues, see Daniel C.K. Chow, Ian Sheldon, & William McGuire, How the United
States’ Withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Benefits China, 4 U. PA. J. L. & PUB.
AFF. 37 (2018).
235
This possibility is proposed in the testimony of Jennifer Hillman before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. See Hearing on U.S. Tools
to Address Chinese Market Distortions Before the U.S.-China Economic and Review
Security Commission, 114th Cong. 2 (2018) (testimony of Jennifer Hillman, Professor
from Practice, Georgetown University Law Center),
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Hillman%20Testimony%20US%20Chi
na%20Comm%20w%20Appendix%20A.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T72A-LRDY].
Professor Hillman is a former member of the WTO Appellate Body. Hillman
believes that the United States should use the WTO dispute settlement system to
challenge China’s state-led practices. She disagrees with the USTR that believes
that it is not possible or advisable to use the WTO dispute settlement system against
China. See 2017 USTR REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
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